In the context of conflict resolution and diplomacy, so much of what we learn as college students and as keen observers of the news centers around government to government contact. The recent Trump-Kim summit is a prime example. Most refreshing about my work at EWI has been the ability to look beyond the outcomes of diplomatic initiatives–track 1 "high diplomacy" as seen in the news–and gain a firsthand appreciation for the mechanics of how the foundations are laid for such breakthroughs.
My initial–and continuing–research task at EWI has been to explore avenues for cooperation between Turkey and Iraq. Instead of simply taking the 2014 Geneva consensus on water sharing in the Tigris river basin between the two neighbors as a given, for example, having the ability to prepare the agenda for similar talks allows me to gain unique insight into the track 2 process. The most critical takeaway has been a simple yet practical iteration of principles communicated in Dr. Feaver's PS 160. The essence of track 2 lies not in its end result, because such processes rarely achieve major breakthroughs unaccompanied by direct government-level contact. What's it worth, then? The impact of track 2 (and "track 1.5", when dialogue reaches the government official level) lies in dialogue's ability to permeate mutual trust even in the event of "failed" dialogues. Critical in how states act is intentions–not just other states' actual intentions but perceptions of their intentions by other states. Thus, even if a particular dialogue reaches no tangible outcome in terms of policy, the effect is still felt. Two sides in a particular dispute have approached one another with the intent to give and request concessions on an equitable basis. Outcomes might not become manifest for a variety of obstacles: the initiative might have been to ambitious, discouraging developments might have occurred in other areas (than the particular domain i.e. security or economic), or local politics demands a different approach. The trust, however, built by track 2 efforts can lend itself to building clearer compartmentalization of issues in the minds of policy makers across states. Assurance of good intentions, built through dialogue, ensures that Iraqi policy makers won't view Turkish officials as malevolent due to a dispute over the water flow of the Tigris when dealing with Turkey on a security issue, such as the training and equipping of Iraqi forces by Turkey. Being also able to involve myself in Turkish-American affairs at EWI has allowed me to express these principles in ways that are personally meaningful to me, while my experience thus far with EWI (as I am no longer residential) has equipped with a deeper lens with which to view major breakthroughs in conflict resolution.
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