Earlier this month I attended an event at the recently opened DC office of Notre Dame’s Keough School of Global Affairs. The mood was optimistic, and not just because of the new office space. Set to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Good Friday Agreement, the discussion focused on what lessons we could learn from the Northern Ireland peace process. Three of the five panelists had worked on that agreement in the 1990s; the others were there to compare it with the Colombian government’s 2016 peace deal with the FARC guerrilla group.
Each of the speakers expressed confidence in how Colombia was handling the accords. They noted that even in Northern Ireland, peace is an ongoing process. Perhaps no panelist was as confident, however, as the Colombian Ambassador to the US, Camilo Reyes. Detailing how civil wars have been part of Colombia’s history since before independence, Reyes commented, “When you look at the peace process, it is true that it is an agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC. But it represents a much heavier weight that comes from history, that comes from even the founding of our nation.” With sweeping language, the ambassador implied that the 2016 accords were a turning point not only in the government’s conflict with the FARC, but also in Colombia’s centuries-old struggle with violence. Although Ambassador Reyes’ hope for the future is laudable, he should be careful about setting expectations too high for the FARC peace accords. Even after a mostly-successful FARC disarmament, questions remain. Between 6% and 15% of FARC guerrillas have refused to follow orders and give up their arms, and the threat of more severe punishment and delayed implementation may encourage more fighters to join dissident groups. Beyond FARC, there still exist other violent organizations, including the Éjercito Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Ejército de Liberación Popular (EPL)—which are currently fighting against each other near the Venezuelan border—as well as right-wing paramilitary groups. The 2016 peace accords are not designed to end conflict with all of these organizations, just the one with FARC. Listening to the ambassador’s statements, however, it’s hard to maintain reasonable expectations for the peace agreement. Overselling an agreement can be just as dangerous as not selling it strongly enough. When President Obama promoted the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—JCPOA), he didn’t just sell it as a solid agreement that would limit Iran’s ability to build a nuclear bomb in exchange for sanctions relief. Instead, he promised that “every pathway to a nuclear weapon is cut off.” The president minimized Iran’s conventional capabilities, claiming that even with sanctions relief, the Islamic State would not become the dominant power in the region. Finally, he argued that the deal would not lead to an increase in funding for Hezbollah since Iran was already backing the terrorist group under heavy sanctions. He was careful not to promise that the nuclear deal would lead to a change in government, but he expressed some cautious optimism that the deal might lead to a Nixon-meets-Mao turning point between the US and Iran. Had Obama acknowledged the shortcomings and simply sold the JCPOA as a tool to restrict Iran’s nuclear buildup, it would have been much harder to criticize the deal. Instead, he promised to halt Iran’s path to a nuclear weapon without incurring any costs in conventional arms proliferation. By pledging so much at so little a cost, President Obama opened the door to a raft of criticism when Iran’s government didn’t change and when it received sanctions relief to put toward non-nuclear military spending. This criticism eventually persuaded President Trump to abandon the agreement in May 2018, reversing the progress that was made in the Obama administration. With the FARC peace accords, just like with the Iran nuclear deal, expectations should be tempered. Ending the civil war with the FARC is an accomplishment that Ambassador Reyes and the rest of the panel can proudly stand behind. There’s no need to promise that the accords will end three centuries of conflict in the country; in fact, making such a promise could put at risk the very peace deal they’re trying to save.
2 Comments
Heather A Settle
7/5/2018 12:26:36 pm
I'm enjoying your posts, Bo. I have a lot of respect for the work LAWG does, and it sounds like you're bringing them a very thoughtful perspective!
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Bo Carlson
7/10/2018 08:48:35 pm
Thanks, Dr. Settle! I've enjoyed the opportunity to work at LAWG and get to know the staff—it's inspiring to see the optimism that they bring to this work and talk to them about how they go into human rights advocacy.
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